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Abstract   
We propose a model in which sovereign credit news from multiple rating agencies 
interacts with market heterogeneity. The model illustrates that the first messenger discloses new 
information while additional messengers play an important role of coordinating heterogeneous 
beliefs. Empirical investigations based on sovereign credit ratings, foreign exchange and equity 
markets confirm that rating news coordinates investors’ beliefs. Sovereign credit rating news 
from both types of messenger induces a significant impact on exchange rates and stock indices. 
Volatility measures increase in response to news from the first messenger while ex-post 
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1. Introduction 
Credit rating agencies (CRAs), such as Fitch, Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s), 
and Standard and Poor’s (S&P), distil information into a rating to represent an issuer’s 
creditworthiness. While there is prior literature on the impact of credit rating news (e.g. Boot 
et al., 2006; Bongaerts et al., 2012; Adelino and Ferreira, 2016), this paper contributes to the 
debate by proposing a model for the interaction between multiple sovereign credit ratings and 
market heterogeneity. The subsequent empirical investigations support the model’s predictions 
that rating news coordinates investors’ heterogeneous beliefs.  
Credit ratings are heavily used in financial markets and regulation. Accessing capital 
markets is a key reason for issuers to solicit credit ratings from CRAs. EU and US regulations 
allow the use of credit ratings to assess banks’ capital adequacy (e.g. the Basel III Accord) and 
for oversight of permitted investments by some institutions. The internal investment policies in 
many companies require a specific rating threshold as a condition to invest. However, the US 
sub-prime crisis and European sovereign debt crisis triggered increased scrutiny of the relative 
performance of CRAs, and instigated a renewed debate on the informativeness of credit ratings 
and the role that CRAs should play in the global financial system. CRAs were viewed as guilty 
of assigning excessively high ratings on structured securities, which had a significant impact 
on the US sub-prime crisis and its consequences (e.g. Mathis et al, 2009). In contrast, criticism 
of CRAs during the European sovereign debt crisis was more focused on the extent and timing 
of sovereign credit rating downgrades of several euro-zone governments. Therefore, issues 
relating to sovereign ratings, corporate ratings and structured finance ratings should be 
considered separately. In response to the role of CRAs in the global financial crisis, the EU and 
the US enacted reforms of the rating industry in 2009 and 2010, respectively. Both EU and US 
CRA regulations seek to reduce the mechanistic reliance on CRAs and hence to reduce market 
overreactions to credit rating actions. In addition, there has been a focus in the recent academic 
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literature on the performance of CRAs (e.g. Adelino and Ferreira, 2016; Drago and Gallo; 2016; 
Hill et al., 2018). Since our paper focuses on the market impact of first-move sovereign credit 
rating news and additional-move rating news (see below), our findings have clear implications 
and should attract interest from participants including policy makers, investors, issuers and 
CRAs.1  
 Typically, multiple CRAs assess the creditworthiness of a given debt issuer/issue. 
Consequently, there is a degree of repetition in the information content embedded in rating 
actions from different CRAs. The research question focuses on whether all types of sovereign 
credit rating news are informative in this multiple-rating context. A key innovation in our model 
is to divide sovereign credit rating actions into two categories: (i) actions that reveal a new CRA 
opinion about the rated issuer’s creditworthiness; and (ii) actions that reaffirm prevailing CRA 
opinions. We term the former as first-move rating news and the latter as additional-move rating 
news. Furthermore, we disentangle the mechanism behind the information value from multiple 
CRAs. 
Heterogeneous beliefs play a crucial role in explaining many empirical features of 
financial markets (e.g. Anderson et al, 2005; Li and Muzere, 2010). Proposing an interaction 
between multiple-CRAs’ opinions and investors’ heterogeneous beliefs, our model yields 
testable hypotheses on how investors react to sovereign credit rating news. The homogeneous 
beliefs hypothesis implies that market participants may not respond to the additional-move 
rating news. Alternatively, the heterogeneous beliefs hypothesis yields three predictions: (i) 
financial asset prices react to both types of rating news; (ii) asset price volatility increases in 
response to first-move rating news because the news increases ex-ante uncertainty and ex-post 
disagreement between investors regarding the true level of the rated issuer’s creditworthiness; 
                                                 
1 Sovereign credit rating actions have attracted particular recent attention. IMF (2010) highlights that sovereign 
default was the most pressing risk facing the global economy, with indebted European countries causing 
widespread concerns. More details on the importance of sovereign credit ratings are discussed in Section 2.2. 
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(iii) reductions in asset price volatility could follow additional-move rating news because this 
reassures market participants, hence reduces the heterogeneity in investors’ beliefs.  
The empirical investigations are conducted in the context of sovereign credit ratings, 
foreign exchange (FX) and stock markets. The information content of sovereign credit rating 
actions has wide implications (e.g. Dittmar and Yuan, 2008; Adelino and Ferreira, 2016), while 
FX and equity markets account for a high proportion of global financial activity and typically 
incorporate new information very quickly (e.g. BIS, 2016). Empirical investigations on FX and 
stock index returns and volatility can reveal robust evidence on the information content of 
sovereign credit rating news, given the high trading volume and the sophisticated participants 
in these markets.  
Related literature mainly focuses on the impact of sovereign credit rating news from 
individual CRA(s) on the prices of financial assets (e.g. Gande and Parsley, 2005; Boot et al., 
2006; Adelino and Ferreira, 2016). In contrast, this paper investigates multiple dimensions of 
price and volatility reactions.2 We employ a number of measures, including abnormal returns, 
realized volatility (RV) based on intraday data to estimate ex-post disagreement among 
investors, and option-implied volatility (IV) as a measure of ex-ante uncertainty. 
A comprehensive sample of the largest three CRAs’ sovereign credit ratings on all 
countries which adopt a floating FX regime (covering 41 countries) during the period from 
January 2007 to April 2013 is used. We find evidence in support of hypotheses pertaining to 
heterogeneous beliefs. First, we report that both first-move and additional-move sovereign 
credit rating actions have a significant impact on FX rates and stock indices. For example, a 1-
notch first-move (additional-move) downgrade of a AAA/Aaa rated sovereign induces a 120 
(75) basis-point currency depreciation against the US$. Second, we find that both ex-ante 
uncertainty and ex-post disagreement among investors increase in response to first-move 
                                                 
2 Papers on multiple ratings primarily focus on investigations of split ratings and their impacts (e.g. Bongaerts et 
al., 2012). 
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sovereign credit rating news. This directly indicates a strong degree of heterogeneity in market 
reactions or investors’ beliefs towards an item of information. Third, there are different 
reactions of the volatility measures following additional-move sovereign credit rating news. 
For the full sample, ex-post volatility reduces significantly while ex-ante volatility does not 
react to additional-move sovereign credit rating news. However, for a sub-sample of EU 
countries, ex-ante volatility also reduces significantly in these cases.   
Further, we provide additional evidence by investigating whether the above results vary 
with different types of rating news. IMF (2010) states that most of the informational value from 
CRAs arises through outlook/watch procedures rather than actual rating level changes. 
Consistent with the heterogeneous beliefs hypothesis, we find: (i) (even 1-notch) sovereign 
credit downgrades following outlook/watch procedures are still informative. FX rates and stock 
indices react to both first-move and additional-move sovereign credit downgrades of issuers 
who were previously on negative outlook/wachlist; (ii) volatility measures increase in response 
to first-move rating news of such downgrades; (iii) volatilities reduce in response to additional-
move news of such downgrades. The robustness of the findings is strengthened by Monte Carlo 
experiments and by controlling for the macroeconomic fundamentals.  
Taken together, the results demonstrate the importance of multiple messengers in the 
sovereign credit rating market. Informative rating news is not exclusively from the first 
messenger, and news from additional messengers plays an important role in coordinating 
investors’ heterogeneous beliefs. The findings are relevant to regulators in the context of the 
debate surrounding increased competition among CRAs (e.g. SEC, 2011).  
           The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature, Section 3 
proposes the model and testable hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and methodology for 
the empirical investigations. Sections 5 and 6 present the empirical results and conclusions. 
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2. Literature review  
2.1. Market heterogeneity, asset prices, and credit ratings 
Investors’ heterogeneous beliefs play an important role in asset pricing. Prior literature 
reveals that market heterogeneity can explain many empirical features of asset prices including 
price bubbles and crashes (e.g. Hong and Stein, 2003), breadth of ownership and returns (e.g. 
Chen et al., 2002), and volatility spill-over effects of shocks (e.g. Li and Muzere, 2010). 
Dynamic heterogeneity models in which asset pricing is based on a stochastic discount factor 
can also explain empirical features of asset prices and volume (e.g. Buraschi and Jiltsov, 2006). 
Heterogeneous beliefs can lead to mispricing and increased price volatility because an asset’s 
price can deviate from its fundamental value, both in the short- and long-term. Therefore, 
market heterogeneity links to uncertainty about risk, which is a potential factor in asset pricing 
(e.g. Anderson et al., 2005; Buraschi and Jiltsov, 2006).  
Another strand of literature shows that credit ratings play an important role in 
uncertainty reduction. Boot et al. (2006) show that credit ratings act as a focal point, and fulfil 
a monitoring role that mitigates the multiple equilibria problem. However, they argue that the 
coordination role of credit ratings only exists hand in hand with a contractual commitment 
between the CRA(s) and the rated issuer(s). An and Chan (2008) and Jory et al (2016) reveal 
that similar situations present in IPO and M&A deals.  
 
2.2. The market impact of sovereign credit ratings 
The sovereign credit rating business is dominated by three global players: Fitch, 
Moody’s and S&P (ESMA, 2016). Recent regulatory reforms in Europe and the US advocate 
increasing competition in the industry. However, there is surprisingly little published evidence 
that compares the performance of the existing CRAs (e.g. Hill et al., 2010). The sovereign credit 
rating acts as a ceiling on non-sovereigns’ ratings (e.g. Adelino and Ferreira, 2016; Almeida et 
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al., 2017; Hill et al., 2018). Sovereign bond yields typically act as indicators of sovereign risk, 
and movements in corporate bond yields are correlated to innovations in sovereign yields 
(Dittmar and Yuan, 2008). Sovereign credit ratings are also found to significantly affect 
international bank loans (Kim and Wu, 2011), equity investments (Gande and Parsley, 2005) 
and foreign direct investment flows (e.g. Cai et al., 2018). Further, a certification role of ratings 
(see e.g. Bongaerts et al., 2012) implies huge regulatory costs associated with sovereign credit 
rating actions. Given investors’ international diversification and the close linkages between 
sovereign credit risk and domestic firms, the information content of sovereign credit rating news 
extends far beyond the rated government’s securities.  
Prior empirical studies demonstrate that sovereign credit ratings are a key element 
influencing asset price movement. This implies that the CRAs hold private information which 
is released into the public domain through credit announcements. Prior studies find strong and 
significant relationships between sovereign credit rating downgrades and a country’s equity 
market return, FX rates, bond spreads and credit default swap (CDS) spreads, while upgrades 
have a limited impact (see Kaminsky and Schumkler, 2002; Sy 2004; Hill and Faff, 2010; 
Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010; Afonso et al., 2012). In addition, negative sovereign credit events 
induce significant spillovers to other countries’ equity, bond, CDS and FX markets, particularly 
in neighbouring countries and during crisis periods (see Gande and Parsley, 2005; Ferreira and 
Gama, 2007; De Santis, 2014; Drago and Gallo; 2016). A government could have an incentive 
to leak the possibility of a positive credit change soon after any favourable discussions with a 
CRA (Gande and Parsley, 2005). In contrast, negative events tend to have a larger surprise 
component and thus are more informative because of the absence of an incentive for an issuer 
to leak negative news prior to a CRA’s announcement. Another possible explanation could be 
the stronger negative reputational impacts for a CRA being tardy in the case of negative events 
(Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2013). 
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Previous literature also shows that different CRAs’ sovereign credit rating actions 
trigger different market responses (e.g. Hill and Faff, 2010; Afonso et al., 2012; Alsakka and 
ap Gwilym, 2013). In addition, disagreements across CRAs on their assessment of sovereigns’ 
creditworthiness are very common (e.g. Vu et al., 2017). CRAs use different models and 
consider different quantitative and qualitative factors and place different weights on these 
factors. CRAs also demonstrate a number of policy differences in terms of rating accuracy, 
rating stability, and the timing of their announcements (e.g. S&P, 2014; Moody’s, 2015; Fitch, 
2017). Therefore, rating news from different CRAs regarding the same underlying information 
will not always enter the public domain simultaneously. A degree of repetition in rating 
information from multiple CRAs is also inevitable. Part of our innovative approach is to divide 
rating news into two groups regardless of which CRA released the news. CRA actions that 
reveal new information regarding the rated issuer’s creditworthiness are considered here as 
first-move rating news while news that reaffirms the former is termed additional-move rating 
news.  
The closely related literature primarily focuses on the reactions of financial assets’ 
prices (i.e. bond yield spreads, CDS spread, abnormal stock returns, FX rates) to news from 
individual CRA(s) (e.g. Gande and Parsley, 2005; Ferreira and Gama, 2007; Ismailescu and 
Kazemi, 2010; Hill et al., 2018). Alternatively, some researches have eliminated ‘contaminated’ 
events where multiple CRAs release sovereign credit rating actions within a specified time 
window. This approach again ignores the relative importance of different rating actions and 
time sequences. Such approaches implicitly assume that investors do not possess nor consider 
other CRAs’ opinions. This paper contributes to prior literature by investigating whether the 
information content is exclusively embedded in the ‘first-move’ type of rating news. 
Additional-move rating news could play an important role in aiding the market consensus 
because a strong degree of heterogeneity in market perceptions inevitably exists. 
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3. The model and hypotheses  
Assume that the time-varying latent credit quality of a given issuer is θt and there are n 
CRAs in the market. 




𝑖        ∀𝑖 = 1. . 𝑛                             (1) 
Where:   𝜑𝑡
𝑖~ 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑(θ𝑡, 𝜎𝜃𝑡
2 )  captures the unbiased element in the CRA’s estimation. 
 𝜗𝑡
𝑖~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑(0, 𝜎𝜗
2) denotes the biasedness in the CRA’s estimation.3  
Therefore, public information at time t regarding the latent creditworthiness is an 
interval estimate, It: 
It = [Min(𝜃𝑡
?̂?), Max(𝜃𝑡
?̂?)]         ∀𝑖 = 1. . 𝑛               (2) 








𝑖̅̅ ̅ + 𝜗𝑡
?̅?                                  (3) 
This indicator captures the agreed component across the CRAs regarding the issuer’s 
creditworthiness. The variation in CRAs’ opinions, i.e. 𝜃?̂?
̅ − Min(𝜃𝑡
?̂?) captures the disagreement 
component or the ambiguity regarding the issuer’s latent creditworthiness.  
Assume that there are Q units of the issuer’s financial assets. Each investor produces 
his/her own valuation (V) based on the information from a CRA of his/her choice i.e. the 




𝑖) > 0 
Assume that there are two main groups of investors who have a constant-absolute-risk-
aversion (CARA) utility function with risk tolerances of βA and βB, respectively. 
                                                 
3 A CRA might be biased at time t, but it is debatable whether the bias is systematic i.e. for all CRAs. Besides, the 
bias tends to predominate for ratings on complex structured products and when these ratings dominate a CRA’s 
revenues (e.g. Mathis et al., 2009). Our focus is on sovereign credit ratings, which are less prone to conflicts of 
interest and are potentially more accurate (e.g. Cornaggia et al., 2017). 
9 
(i) Group A: rational investors believe that ?̅?𝑡 is the indicator of the issuer’s 
creditworthiness. Their valuation of the asset would be Vt = f(?̅?𝑡). Vt could be considered 
as fair fundamental value. 
(ii) Group B: conservative investors believe that Min(θt
î) is the indicator of the latent 
creditworthiness although it is a downward biased estimator of θt.
4 Their valuation of 
the asset would be 
 𝑉𝑡
𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 = 𝑓 (Min(𝜃𝑡
?̂?)) = 𝑓 (𝜃𝑡
?̅?) − 𝐻𝑡 = 𝑉𝑡 − 𝐻𝑡 where Ht >0 
   Where Ht measures the degree of undervaluation by the group of conservative investors. 
The undervaluation is affected by the market heterogeneity driven by the ambiguity regarding 
the latent creditworthiness.  
At t+1, CRA k announces a sovereign credit rating downgrade of the issuer which 
reveals new information into the public domain regarding the issuer’s latent creditworthiness5: 
It+1 ≢ It                                                                    (4) 
   𝜃𝑡+1
𝑘  ∉ [Min(𝜃𝑡
?̂?), Max(𝜃𝑡






< 0                           (6) 
 Min(𝜃𝑡+1
𝑖 ) < Min(𝜃𝑡
𝑖)                        (7) 
We regard this rating news as first-move because there is new credit information which was not 
publicly available at t.  
At t+2, CRA l announces a sovereign credit rating downgrade of the same issuer. For 
ease of exposition, assume that   𝜃𝑡+2
𝑙 ∈ [Min(𝜃𝑡+1
𝑙 ), Max(?̂?𝑡+1
𝑙 )] otherwise we repeat the 
Equations (4), (6), (7). This leads to: 
                                                 
4 Another group of investors who use Max(𝜃𝑡
?̂?) could be modelled. This is much less likely in the context of rating 
usage (see e.g. Bongaerts et al., 2012). Also, it is trivial and does not alter the model generalisation. 
5 We only use downgrades in our model for the sake of brevity and because investors tend to be more concerned 
about downgrades. Including sovereign credit rating upgrades does not affect the model generalisation.  
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< 0                           (9) 
Min(𝜃𝑡+2
𝑖 ) = Min(?̂?𝑡+1
𝑖 )                        (10) 
?̅?𝑡+2 − Min(?̂?𝑡+2
𝑖 ) < ?̅?𝑡+1 − Min(𝜃𝑡+1
𝑖 )   (11) 
 
We refer to this type of sovereign credit rating action as additional-move rating news because 
there is no new information regarding the underlying creditworthiness added to prevailing 
public information. CRA l simply confirms other CRAs’ opinions. 
We make two competing assumptions about investors’ beliefs or how investors react to 
credit rating news. Under the assumption that the market is homogeneous, the model predicts: 
- If Group A of rational investors dominates the market, Equations (6) and (9) indicate 
that both types of rating news are informative.  
- If Group B of conservative investors are the main players who drive market 
movements, Equations (7) and (10) indicate that only first-move rating news is 
informative. Financial asset prices only react to first-move rating news (i.e. at t+1).  
Alternatively, the heterogeneous beliefs assumption implies that both groups of 
investors could drive the market movements i.e. the multiple valuations exist. Applying the 
utility function maximization, the demands for the asset by each group of investors would be 
βA(Vt-P) and βB(Vt-Ht-P), respectively. Imposing the market clearing condition, we have: 
β𝐴(V𝑡 − P) +  β𝐵(V𝑡 − 𝐻𝑡 − P) = 𝑄 
Where P and Q denotes the clearing price and supply of the asset, respectively. 






                    (12) 
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Equation (12) shows that the price depends not only on the fundamental valuation (Vt) but also 
the level of market heterogeneity which is in turn driven by the ambiguity regarding the issuer’s 
creditworthiness. 6  
Following prior papers on the relationship between heterogeneous beliefs and asset 
pricing (e.g. Chen et al., 2002; Xiong and Yan, 2010), we assume that 
𝐻𝑡 = ℎ𝑉𝑡 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 ℎ ∈ [0,1)  
h measures the degree of market heterogeneity regarding the true valuation and 
independent to Vt. This leads to the following equations: 











ℎ2]     (13) 
Equation (13) shows that price volatility is greater than the volatility of the fundamental 
value. In other words, there is an additional element in price volatility due to the degree of 
market heterogeneity driven by the ambiguity regarding the latent creditworthiness. The greater 


















< 0                       (16) 
Equations (14) - (16), respectively, reflect the following features: (i) price increases 
when the fundamental value increases; (ii) price reduces with respect to the degree of ambiguity 
                                                 
6 This valuation equation allows us to focus on the main idea of the interaction between market heterogeneity and 
rating actions. However, asset prices may also include a bubble element, e.g. imprecise signals or investors’ over-
confidence. In a more complex version (available upon request), we add another variable to capture bubbles in 
investors’ valuations. In the context of sovereign rating actions, the solution for this alternative proves to be very 
similar to the simpler model reported in the paper. 
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regarding the issuer’s credit quality; (iii) the magnitude of the impact of the ambiguity on price 
is larger for high levels of creditworthiness. 
 Equations (6), (9), (14) and (16) imply that both types of negative sovereign credit 
rating news should trigger significant reductions in asset price. First-move negative rating news 
reduces the fundamental value and increases the level of ambiguity, thus the price should 
decline significantly. Additional-move sovereign credit rating news reduces both fundamental 
value and market heterogeneity. However, the impact on the former outweighs the impact on 







ℎ) > 0     (17) 
Equation (17) shows that a greater degree of market heterogeneity leads to higher asset 
price volatility. Therefore, there should be significant movements in price volatility in response 
to both first-move and additional-move sovereign credit rating news. Price volatility should 
increase (decrease) in response to first-move (additional-move) rating news. Higher volatility 
is intuitive as a significant change in the price during the announcement day should increase 
the volatility measures. The market movements should be short-lived. Meanwhile, the volatility 
reduction at t+2 is attributed to the reduction in ambiguity surrounding the latent 
creditworthiness. It is noteworthy that price changes during t+2 should raise realized volatility. 
Overall, changes in volatility could be insignificant. Nonetheless, any reduction in volatility 
following additional-move sovereign credit rating news indicates much more homogeneous 
beliefs i.e. an important role of market coordinator.  
It is plausible that investors may not view all CRAs with equal credibility. In other 
words, some investors only consider a subset of 𝜃𝑡
?̂?  ∀𝑖 = 1. . 𝑚 < 𝑛 and m may vary across 
investors. This leads to more than two groups of investors and strengthens the above predictions 
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because additional-move sovereign credit rating news bridges even more gaps between groups 
of investors with heterogeneous beliefs. 7 
Overall, the model yields the following testable hypotheses: If homogeneous beliefs 
prevail, we should discover the following evidence: 
H1: First-move sovereign credit rating news triggers significant movements in prices. 
Additional-move sovereign credit rating news may not trigger significant price 
reactions. 
H2: Volatility increases in response to first-move sovereign credit rating news. 
Additional-move sovereign credit rating news does not trigger volatility reductions. 
Alternatively, if heterogeneous beliefs prevail, we anticipate observing the following evidence: 
H3: Both types of sovereign credit rating news trigger significant movements in prices. 
H4: Volatility increases after sovereign credit first-move rating news whereas volatility 
reduces following additional-move rating news.  
 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1. Data  
 We test the hypotheses using sovereign credit ratings, FX and stock markets. The dataset 
is an unbalanced panel which covers 41 countries during the period from January 2007 to April 
2013 as listed in Table 1. We include all countries whose currencies are named in BIS (2016) 
except for the following nine: China, Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, and Denmark whose FX 
                                                 
7 In the model, we implicitly assume that markets are efficient at least in the semi-strong form. Therefore, market 
participants react in a timely manner to all public information. In our context, investors react in a timely manner 
to all sovereign rating announcements. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that a market might not comply with neither 
semi-strong nor strong forms of informational efficiency. Market participants might only follow subsets of CRAs 
(e.g., in line with Bianchi and Jehiel’s (2015) model of extrapolation from subsets of public signals). This would 
lead to more than two groups of investors and development of a more complex model which can be solved in a 
similar way. 
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regimes are categorised as (crawling) pegged/fixed in at least one version of the IMF de facto 
classifications; Canada, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland who did not experience any 
sovereign credit rating actions by the three CRAs during the sample period.8  
At the beginning of the sample period, the CRAs disagreed on the creditworthiness of 
most of the sampled sovereigns except for some AAA/Aaa-rated cases i.e. Austria, Finland, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, and the UK. Later in the sample period, almost all of 
these were downgraded, leading to additional and longer-lasting disagreements between the 
CRAs. This fact implies that an interval estimate, rather than a point estimate, of a given 
sovereign’s creditworthiness was available to market participants prior to many rating events 
(which is relevant for our model).    
 
4.1.1. Sovereign credit ratings  
Daily observations of long-term foreign-currency credit ratings, outlook and watch 
status of sovereigns rated by Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P are sourced from the CRAs’ 
publications. We convert sovereign credit ratings to numerical scores on a 58-point 
comprehensive credit rating (CCR) scale in order to capture information on both actual ratings 
and outlook/watch procedures.9 In the CCR scale, rating symbols are converted as follows: 
AAA/Aaa ≡ 58, AA+/Aa1 ≡ 55, AA/Aa2 ≡ 52 ... CCC-/Caa3 ≡ 4, CC-D ≡ 1. Adjustments for 
(positive/negative) outlook and watch signals are made by adding ±1 and ±2, respectively. Non-
linearity in the rating scale is plausible, which means that the differences between rating levels 
                                                 
8 US$ is used as the reference currency given its dominance in international trades i.e. 88% of global FX trades 
(BIS, 2016). Therefore, USA is not included in the list of sample countries. The USA credit rating remains 
AAA/Aaa during most of the sample period. In August 2011, S&P downgraded USA to AA+ while Moody’s and 
Fitch kept their ratings at Aaa/AAA until the end of the sample period (with negative outlook from August and 
November 2011, respectively).  
9 A complete CRA credit opinion on an issuer consists of a credit rating and a rating outlook/watch status. Outlook 
and watch signals are at least as important as actual rating changes in terms of the impact on financial markets 
(e.g. Ferreira and Gama (2007); Hill and Faff (2010)). Using a rating scale that incorporates rating, outlook and 
watch is common in sovereign credit rating literature (e.g. Sy, (2004), Gande and Parsley (2005), Ferreira and 
Gama (2007), Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2013), Vu et al. (2017)). 
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are not equal. Historical observations on default rates across rating categories suggest non-
linearity in the rating scale (see e.g. IMF, 2010; S&P, 2013). In order to control for this, we 
employ a logit-transformation of the rating scale, as follows: 








































LCCR                   (18) 
Table 2 demonstrates the transformation of the alphabetical ratings to CCR and LCCR 
numerical scores and the varying effect of a given rating action across the levels of 
creditworthiness. It is reasonable for creditworthiness changes to be more significant when 
relating to near-default or AAA/Aaa rated issuers (e.g. as evidenced by the reactions to rating 
downgrades of France, UK, and USA in 2011-2013). The speculative threshold is also of critical 
concern to rating users, regulators, and investment guidelines (e.g. Bongaerts el al., 2012). For 
example, the U.S. Investment Company Act of 1940 restricts pension funds and municipalities 
to investment-grade securities (e.g. SEC, 2011). Our log-transformation of the rating scale 
addresses this issue by assigning greater weight for creditworthiness changes to issuers at or 
near (i) triple-A; (ii) default; (iii) the speculative-investment threshold (and assigning the lowest 
weight when sovereign credit rating news relates to issuers in the middle of the investment-
grade or the middle of the speculative-grade).  
Table 3 summarises the sovereign credit rating events for each CRA. The CRAs released 
521 rating events during the sample period for the selected sovereigns. S&P released 202 
signals while there are 166 (153) rating signals by Moody’s (Fitch). During the sample period, 
there are 38 (47), 19 (36), 28 (38) positive (negative) outlook signals10 for the sample countries 
by S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch, respectively. The corresponding figures of watch actions are 7 
                                                 
10 Outlook signals are defined as follows. Negative (positive) outlook signals include placing a sovereign on 
negative (positive) outlook and changing positive (negative) to stable outlook. Watch signals are defined similarly.  
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(27), 12 (23), and 3 (14). During the sample period, the CRAs released 59 combined rating 
signals whereby sovereign credit rating level and outlook/watch changes were announced in 
the same action. All S&P downgrades follow negative outlook or watch while the 
corresponding proportions for Moody’s and Fitch are 90% and 87%, respectively. The 
equivalent figures for upgrades are 70%, 89%, and 52%. These figures imply heavy utilisation 
of outlook/watch procedures prior to actual sovereign credit rating changes during the sample 
period.  
A key innovation here is to separate first-move from additional-move sovereign credit 
rating actions. For every day during the sample period, the maximum difference across the three 
CRAs’ opinions (i.e. CCR values on the same sovereign) is measured. This captures the 
variation or the boundary of credit information which is available to the market before rating 
events. If any sovereign credit rating action increases the maximum difference (i.e. a new 
assessment of the rated entity’s creditworthiness falls beyond the boundary), it is defined as 
first-move news. Otherwise, it is recorded as additional-move rating news.11  During the sample 
period, the three CRAs release 174 first-move actions and 285 additional-move actions.12 
Among the three CRAs, S&P released 90 first-move signals compared to 44 and 40 from Fitch 
and Moody’s, respectively. The corresponding numbers of additional-move rating actions are 
quite similar across the CRAs, ranging from 93 to 98. The numbers of additional-move rating 
signals, thus, exceed first-move counterparts for each CRA. This implies a limitation in prior 
literature on the information content of rating news from a single CRA or from multiple CRAs 
treated individually. A significant proportion of sovereign credit rating actions from any given 
                                                 
11 There were only nine days when more than one CRA released credit actions on the same sovereign. In these 
cases, only one action is counted as either a first-move or an additional-move while other CRAs’ actions in the 
same days are excluded from the sample. The rule is applied in these cases that negative (positive) news from the 
most conservative (generous) CRA is retained. 
12 The number of first-move and additional-move actions together is less than the total number of signals from the 
three CRAs because we discard 62 rating actions where rating signals occurred on the same days i.e. 59 signals in 
cases of combined rating actions; and three signals during nine multiple-CRA-action days.  
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CRA could simply repeat the information embedded in recent actions by other CRAs. 
Investigations based on an individual CRA do not separate potentially more “informative” first-
move news from others, thus, could yield limited or even misleading insights.  
 
4.1.2. FX data 
The dataset of bilateral FX rates against the US$ covers all currencies named in BIS 
(2016) during January 2007 to April 2013 (apart from exceptions named at the beginning of 
Section 4.1). The sample includes 17 EU countries using the Euro, which enter the sample when 
they started using the Euro.13 All the sampled countries are categorised as having free floating 
or floating FX regimes in every IMF de facto classification since the classification began in 
2006.14 The final data covers 41 countries and major currencies that account for approximately 
90% of global FX market trades (authors’ estimates based on BIS, 2016). Daily data of mid-
quoted FX rates is retrieved from DataStream (the primary source is Thomson Reuters). 
We use two measures of FX volatility. First, realized volatility (RV) based on intraday 
data. RV represents the ex-post variance of intraday log-returns on a given day under the 
assumption that prices follow a semi-martingale process (Andersen et al., 2003a), and therefore 
measures the degree of heterogeneity in investors’ beliefs within a given trading day. Second, 
option-implied volatility (IV) captures the FX option market participants’ expected volatility 
of future FX rates. IV represents ex-ante uncertainty about the value of a currency against the 
US$. One-month maturity at-the-money (ATM) option-implied volatility (IV) is employed for 
the empirical investigations.15  
                                                 
13 All EU countries are included from the beginning of the sample period except Cyprus and Malta from January 
2008, Slovakia from January 2009, Estonia from January 2011. 
14 There are two exceptions (Malaysia and Russia) categorised in “Other managed arrangement” in the IMF de 
facto classifications in 2010 and 2012. This category is a residual and is used when the exchange rate arrangement 
does not meet the criteria for any of the other categories. 
15 Investigations on IVs for other maturities (i.e. 3-, 6-month, 1-year) produce qualitatively similar results 
(available upon request). 
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Daily RV data is collected from Bloomberg.16 RV is estimated based on 30-minute 









tkt rRV  
RVt is FX realized volatility at day t, and rk,t  is the k
th 30-minute FX log-return at day t. 
There are 58,994 daily RV observations with mean, median, and standard deviation of 
-0.0021, -0.0468, and 5.2871, respectively.18  
Daily data of mid-quoted OTC FX 1-month maturity ATM IV is retrieved from 
DataStream. There are 64,715 daily observations of one-month FX IV. The daily changes in IV 
have a mean of -0.0013, median of 0, and standard deviation of 0.7962.19  
The standard deviation of daily changes in RV is almost seven times larger than for IV. 
This implies higher sensitivity of RV to news during the sample period (consistent with some 
prior studies e.g. Christensen and Prabhala, 1998). This is entirely reasonable because RV 
captures ex-post volatility or market participants’ intraday disagreements, whereas 1-month IV 
measures the expected volatility or market participants’ ex-ante uncertainty over a much longer 
period, i.e. with a horizon of the following month.  
 
4.1.3. Equity data 
The dataset covers national stock indices for the same 41 countries during the period 
from January 2007 to April 2013. Daily data of closing, intraday low and high prices for the 
sampled stock indices is retrieved from DataStream. 
                                                 
16 Bloomberg started providing RV based on intraday data from March 2007. Therefore, the dataset of RV covers 
the period from March 2007 to April 2013 compared to January 2007 to April 2013 for IV.  
17 Andersen et al. (2003a) use the 30-minute frequency as a suitable balance between the accuracy of RV 
measurement and avoiding market microstructure frictions. 
18 1% winsorisation (0.5% each tail) is used to mitigate the effects of outliers. 
19 As for RV, 1% winsorisation is used.  
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Stock volatility is captured by the intraday high-low range (Parkinson, 1980). The range 








 Prior papers demonstrate that the range based volatility estimator appears robust to 
microstructure noise such as bid-ask bounce (e.g. Brandt and Diebold, 2006).20  
 
4.2. Methodology 
The FX and equity markets can incorporate new information very quickly. Therefore, 
we employ both [t+0] and [t+1] windows to capture the market reactions following releases of 
rating news. While [t+0] measures the return and volatility change from day t-1 to day t, [t+1] 
reflects the corresponding measures from day t to day t+1. [1, 5] captures any reactions during 
the first week following sovereign credit rating events.21 FX rates are often assumed to follow 
a martingale process (e.g. Andersen et al., 2003a). Therefore, FX returns are employed as 
abnormal returns. For stock indices, we employ mean-adjusted abnormal returns.22 The 
abnormal return of a stock index on a given day equals its logarithmic return on the day minus 
the mean return during the period from day -250 to day -50. 
We estimate the following equations:  
tititititisi uYearCorCCRLCCRr ,1,31,21,1,, **int****              (19) 
                                                 
20 Options on stock indices did not exist for many sampled countries, thus we cannot conduct investigations of 
stock index option-implied volatility for all cases. A sample of RV based on intraday data of stock indices is 
retrieved from Oxford-Man Institute of Quantitative Finance. However, this sample covers only 11 of the sampled 
countries. Most of these have limited numbers of rating events i.e. 38 first-move and 65 additional-move actions. 
The investigations based on this sample (available on request) yield similar results to those presented in this paper. 
21 Equations (19) and (20) are estimated using [-1] and [-5, -1] time windows. The results, available on request, 
show that the coefficient of ΔLCCR is insignificant in all estimations. This implies that any endogeneity problem 
is unlikely to be present. In other words, negative sovereign credit rating news seems not to be leaked during our 
sample period. 
22 We also employ the market model with MSCI World Stock Index as a proxy for the market portfolio. The results 
(available upon request) are very similar. 
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tititititisi uYearCorCCRLCCRV ,1,31,21,1,, **int***||*         (20) 
 
ri,s is a vector of cumulative abnormal returns on country i’s assets i.e. FX rate against the 
US$ and stock index during the time windows s: [t+0], [t+1], [t+1, t+5].  
ΔVi,s is a vector of changes in the volatility measures (RV, IV, High-low range) of country i’s 
FX rate or stock index during the time window s. 
∆LCCRi,t represents changes in the log-transformed credit rating of sovereign i at day t. We use 
∆LCCR for Equation (19) whereas |∆LCCR| is used for Equation (20). With returns, the 
directional effect of rating actions is very important e.g. one expects negative actions to induce 
currency depreciation. With volatility, we are investigating whether rating actions affect 
volatility in either positive or negative directions i.e. it is plausible that a negative rating action 
could increase or decrease volatility e.g. Beber and Brandt (2006, 2009). Our primary focus is 
to drill down to first-move versus additional actions, in both cases.  
CCR is the comprehensive sovereign credit rating. CCR is included as an explanatory variable 
to control for macroeconomic news and other fundamentals of the rated sovereigns, along with 
the inclusion of country and year dummies.  
ri,t-1 is the return of country i’s assets at day t-1 (corresponding to the dependent variables i.e. 
domestic currency and stock index). This variable is included to control for a possible leverage 
effect (e.g. Andersen et al, 2003a, b). 
inti,t-1 is the domestic policy interest rate which has impact on the FX rates (e.g. Andersen et al., 
2003b). Therefore, we include this variable for the FX investigations only.23 
Co and Year are full vectors of country and year dummies. 
                                                 
23 Equations (19) and (20) are also estimated with an alternative explanatory variable, which is the interest rate 
spread between a domestic country i and the U.S., to control for the capital flows based on the interest rate 
differentials. The results, available on request, are consistent. The coefficient is insignificant in all estimations. 
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We estimate Equations (19) and (20) for first-move and additional-move sovereign 
credit rating actions, separately. These estimations are based on country-matched samples. 
From the full sample, we exclude non-rating-event days within six months around sovereign 
credit rating announcements for each country. Subsequenly, non-rating-event days are 
randomly selected. For each country, the number of selected non-rating-event observations 
equals the number of rating events (column 3 of Table 1). This is done to mitigate market noise 
since the number of credit rating events on each country is very limited compared to the number 
of non-event days. We perform Monte Carlo experiments based on 10,000 estimations of each 
equation (e.g. Gande and Parsley, 2005). Each estimation is based on one independent country-
matched sample. The random reshuffling of non-rating-event days many times mitigates the 
omitted variables problem. 
 
5. Empirical results    
5.1. Impact on FX markets 
5.1.1. Impact on exchange rates   
  Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients of Equation (19). The dependent variable is 
cumulative FX returns over the time windows, i.e. [0], [1], [1, 5] where day 0 denotes rating 
event days. The main independent variable is the daily change in the log-transformation of the 
CCR. It should be noted that 1-unit changes in the CCR are associated with varying effects on 
the LCCR depending on the starting level of a sovereign credit rating (illustrated in Table 2).  
Panel A of Table 4 shows that both first-move and additional-move sovereign credit 
rating news are influential in the market, implying that both types of rating news are 
informative. The coefficient of ΔLCCR is significantly negative implying that deterioration in 
a sovereign’s creditworthiness leads to currency depreciation. A first-move 1-CCR point 
downgrade of a AAA/Aaa-rated sovereign triggers a 24-basis-points immediate currency 
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depreciation on the announcement day (24 basis points = - [-0.0032] * 0.748 which is ΔLCCR 
for AAA/Aaa-rated issuers (see Table 2)). Meanwhile, the additional-move counterparts trigger 
a change of 24 basis points on day 1. The effect of first-move sovereign credit rating news is 
evident for up to a week whereas the impact of additional-move sovereign credit rating news is 
immediate and short-lived. This supports the heterogeneous beliefs hypothesis in the sense that 
it takes time for investors to adjust their beliefs in response to the information from the first 
messenger, whereas there are immediate and decisive market reactions to a second/third 
messenger’s confirmation action.   
There is a possibility that the market may react differently to downgrades versus 
negative outlook/watch announcements. Therefore, we decompose the impact of rating news 
into: (i) the effect of downgrades (Panel B of Table 4); (ii) the effect of negative outlook/watch 
(Panel C of Table 4).24 First-move rating downgrades trigger immediate reactions on the 
announcement day, while first-move negative outlook/watch news has a longer lasting effect 
on FX returns. Additional-move counterparts only trigger short-lived reactions (day [1]). 
Because 93% of the downgrades in the sample were preceded by outlook/watch announcements 
(see Table 3 and Section 4.1.1), market participants were potentially aware of the negative 
information underlying the downgrades prior to the event. Therefore, such downgrades might 
confirm prior anticipation rather than increasing the heterogeneity of investors’ beliefs. In that 
sense, first-move negative outlook/watch signals are more likely to be controversial or 
unexpected, and thereby induce longer-lasting effects in returns. In contrast, additional-move 
negative outlook/watch signals do not induce long-lasting effects, which can be explained by 
considering investors’ heterogeneous beliefs. 
                                                 
24 We focus on negative news when decomposing the rating news impact for two reasons: (i) prior literature shows 
that negative news tends to matter more (e.g. Gande and Parsley, 2005); (ii) there were limited numbers of first-
move upgrades (positive outlook/watch) during the sample period. 
23 
The magnitude of the effects on FX returns from first-move rating sovereign credit news 
is larger than from additional-move sovereign credit news. A 1-notch downgrade of a 
AAA/Aaa-rated sovereign triggers a 122 (75) basis points depreciation if the downgrade comes 
from the first (later) messenger for the [0] ([1]) windows.25 The coefficients of CCR are 
insignificant, implying that the current level of creditworthiness is not influential.  
This empirical evidence of Table 4 supports H3, rejects H1, and is strongly consistent 
with the predictions of our model relating to heterogeneous beliefs interacting with multiple 
sovereign credit ratings.     
 
5.1.2. Impact on foreign exchange rate volatility 
Tables 5 and 6 report the estimated coefficients of Equation (20) using RV and IV as 
the proxy for FX volatility, respectively. Specifically, the dependent variable in Table 5 (6) is 
cumulative changes in RV (IV) over the time windows, i.e. [0], [1], [1, 5] where day 0 denotes 
rating event days. The main independent variable is the absolute value of the daily change in 
the rating scale.  
Panel A of Table 5 shows that both first-move and additional-move sovereign credit 
rating news triggers significant movements in RV. This is consistent with the reactions of FX 
rates (presented in Table 4) indicating that both types of sovereign credit rating news are 
informative. The reactions to first-move sovereign credit rating news are very different from 
those for additional-move sovereign credit rating news. In cases of first-move news, the 
coefficient of |ΔLCCR| is significantly positive for the [0] window implying that first-move 
rating actions trigger volatility. Meanwhile, additional-move rating signals lead to reduced 
volatility i.e. the coefficient of |ΔLCCR| is significantly negative for the [1] window. The effect 
of both first-move and additional-move rating news on FX volatility is immediate and short-
                                                 
25 121 basis points = [-0.0078] * [-1.555]; 75 basis points = [-0.0048] * [-1.555]. 1.555 is ΔLCCR for top-rated 
issuers (see Panel B of Table 4 and Table 2). 
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lived. The results reject hypothesis H2 in favour of H4 thus presenting important evidence of 
investors’ heterogeneous beliefs. First-move sovereign credit rating news increases 
disagreements among investors regarding domestic currency whereas reductions in FX market 
heterogeneity follow additional-move rating news. 
The decomposition of the impact of negative sovereign credit rating news (Panels B and 
C of Table 5) reveals that both first-move downgrades and negative outlook/watch increase FX 
realized volatility on the announcement day. In contrast, there is consistent evidence that 
additional-move downgrades reassure the market i.e. reduced ex-post volatility for the [1] 
window. The market seems to over-react to additional-move negative outlook/watch signals, 
whereby RV increases on announcement days and reduces in the following days.  
Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients of Equation (20) for IV reactions in response 
to each type of rating news. Panel A of Table 6 shows that only first-move rating news triggers 
significant movements in IV on the announcement day. The contrast with Table 5 could be 
explained by the fact that IV is less sensitive to news compared to RV (see Section 4.1.2 for 
details). The coefficient of |ΔLCCR| is significantly positive implying that first-move rating 
actions trigger increased IV on the announcement day. The magnitude of the increases in IV is 
much less than the corresponding effect on RV. For example, Panel B of Table 6 shows that a 
first-move 1-notch downgrade of a AAA/Aaa-rated sovereign triggers IV increases by 3.81% 
(|-1.555|*0.0245) on the event days, while the corresponding figure for RV (see Panel B of 
Table 5) is 29.7% (|-1.555|*0.1909). It is noteworthy that IV captures FX option markets’ 
reactions while RV measures the movements in the underlying FX markets. Option markets 
tend to play a leading role in the price (information) discovery process (e.g. Chakravarty et al., 
2004). Results in Panels B and C of Table 6 show that FX option market participants do not 
react to additional-move sovereign credit rating news, while first-move sovereign credit 
downgrades (negative outlook/watch news) trigger significant IV movements for the [0] and 
25 
[1, 5] windows (on the announcement day). IV increases on the event days of sovereign rating 
downgrades, then reduces significantly during the following days, with the magnitude of the 
reductions being larger than prior increases (see Panel B). Overall, the results in Table 6 reject 
H4 in favour of H2. 
 
5.1.3. European countries 
 Motivated by the European sovereign debt crisis, we have investigated the research 
questions using a sub-sample of 22 European countries only.26 The results of Equations (19) 
and (20) as reported in Table 7 are qualitatively similar to those in Tables 4-6.27 Panel A of 
Table 7 shows that both first-move and additional-move sovereign credit rating downgrades 
trigger significant movements in exchange rates, implying that both types of rating news are 
informative. A first-move 1-notch downgrade of a AAA/Aaa-rated EU sovereign triggers a 121-
basis-point (- [-0.0078] *1.555) immediate currency depreciation on the announcement day. 
The additional-move counterparts trigger a change of 76 basis points on day 1.   
Panels B and C of Table 7 show that both first-move and additional-move sovereign 
credit rating downgrades have a significant impact on FX volatility. Yet, the reactions to first-
move sovereign credit rating downgrades are very different from those for additional-move 
rating downgrades. First-move downgrades trigger increases in both realized volatility (Panel 
B) and implied volatility (Panel C) on the announcement day. In contrast to the results of the 
full sample (see Section 5.1.2), additional-move downgrades reduce both ex-post and ex-ante 
volatility in European countries for the [1] and [0] windows respectively. The results are also 
economically meaningful. A first-move 1-notch downgrade of a AAA/Aaa-rated EU sovereign 
                                                 
26 The sub-sample of European countries includes: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, UK. 
27 The cases of ‘all rating news’ and ‘negative outlook/watch signals’ are available on request. They are not 
included in the paper due to space constraints. 
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triggers a 26.1% ([0.1678] *1.555) upsurge in FX realized volatility immediately, while an 
additional-move counterpart reduces realized volatility by 25.3% ([0.1629] *1.555) for the [1] 
window. In general, the results for the EU sub-sample support a view that additional-move 
rating downgrades reduce asset price volatility and uncertainty, with stronger results than for 
the full sample.  
 
5.2. Impact on domestic equity markets 
Table 8 reports the estimated coefficients of Equation (19) for stock index abnormal 
returns. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal returns over the time windows 
considered, i.e. [0], [1], [1,5]. Panel A of Table 8 shows that first-move (additional-move) 
sovereign credit rating news are influential in stock markets on the announcement day (on day 
1). The coefficient of ΔLCCR is significantly positive suggesting that deterioration in a 
sovereign’s creditworthiness induces falls in its domestic stock index. The decomposition of 
rating news, presented in Panels B and C of Table 8, shows that first-move downgrades have a 
strong immediate effect. Additional-move rating downgrades and negative outlook/watch news 
are informative for the [1] window. While negative outlook/watchlist announcements from 
additional messenger(s) deliver the strongest impact on domestic stock indices, there are 
insignificant reactions to such news from a first-mover CRA. These results are consistently in 
support of the heterogeneous beliefs hypothesis.  
Table 9 reports the estimated coefficients of Equation (20) for stock indices. The 
dependent variable is cumulative volatility changes over the time windows considered, i.e. [0], 
[1], [1, 5]. The main independent variable is the absolute value of the daily change in the rating 
scale.  Panel A of Table 9 shows that only first-move sovereign credit rating news induces 
significant increases in equity market volatility for each time window. There is no significant 
movement in volatility in response to additional-move rating actions. The results reject 
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hypothesis H2 and H4. First-move sovereign credit rating news raises the volatility of the rated 
country’s equity market whereas additional rating news has little impact. The decomposition of 
the impact of sovereign credit rating news is revealed in Panels B and C of Table 9. First-move 
sovereign rating downgrades induce increased volatility in each time window, while additional-
move downgrades reduce volatility on day 1. First-move negative outlook/watch news increase 
volatility for the [1, 5] window, while additional-move outlook/watch news have insignificant 
impact on volatility.  
Taken together, the empirical results in Tables 4-8 are in support of: (i) the existence of 
heterogeneous investors’ beliefs in both FX and stock markets; and (ii) additional-move 
sovereign credit rating news having a coordination role at least in the context of FX markets. 
In stock markets, only downgrades (not negative outlook/watch announcements) from 
additional messenger(s) coordinate investors’ heterogeneous beliefs.  
 
5.3. Information content in the downgrades of issuers already on negative 
outlook/watchlist 
Outlook and watchlist status allow CRAs to “buy time” and signal that the rated 
sovereign is likely to be downgraded/upgraded in the medium or short term respectively. 
Outlook/watch signals reveal a significant portion of the negative/positive information 
underlying any subsequent downgrades/upgrades (e.g. IMF, 2010). Additional-move sovereign 
credit rating downgrades preceded by outlook/watch announcements confirm both the CRA’s 
own prior opinion and other CRAs’ opinions. Under homogeneous beliefs, such downgrades 
should not contain significant incremental information content, hence should not impose 
significant impacts on assets’ returns nor price volatility.28 Specifically, equivalent empirical 
investigations on downgrades preceded by outlook/watch should reject H3 and H4 in favour of 
                                                 
28 Please note that most downgrades in the sample are one-notch (see Table 3). 
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H1 and H2. Table 10 reports the results i.e. estimated coefficients of Equations (19) and (20) 
based on the sub-sample of sovereign credit rating downgrades preceded by outlook/watch. 
Panel A shows the results for FX markets while Panel B is for equity markets.  
Panel A.1 indicates that first-move (additional-move) sovereign credit announcements 
of such downgrades trigger reactions in FX and stock index returns for the [0] ([1]) windows, 
while Panel B.1 shows that first-move downgrades trigger a significant market reaction on the 
announcement day. Domestic currency depreciation and stock index declines follow such 
downgrades regardless of whether they are from the first messenger or second/third messengers. 
This is direct evidence in support of H3. Panels A.2, A.3 and B.2 of Table 10 further confirm 
the heterogeneous beliefs hypothesis. Additional-move sovereign rating downgrades preceded 
by outlook/watch announcements induce reductions in both domestic currency volatility and 
stock index volatility for the [1], [0] and [0] windows respectively. This directly rejects H2 in 
favour of H4. It is noteworthy that previous results (Table 6, Panel B) suggested that additional-
move sovereign credit rating downgrades do not trigger a significant impact on FX option-
implied volatility. This section suggests the explanation that additional-move downgrades 
without prior notice (i.e. outlook/watch) induce either no impact or increases in IV. 
There is a very small likelihood that sovereign credit rating events may coincide with 
important macroeconomic news releases within one week after rating events. These 
macroeconomic fundamentals could drive the movements in domestic stock prices, currency 
returns and volatilities. Therefore, we conduct robustness checks against business cycle effects. 
The macroeconomic fundamentals include Gross Domestic Product (GDP), consumer price 
index (CPI), industrial production index, unemployment rates, fiscal deficit and trade balance 
for the sampled countries and the U.S. The results (available upon request) are qualitatively 
similar. We also conduct equivalent investigations on different maturities of the FX option-
implied volatility which yield similar results. 
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6. Conclusions 
During recent crises, CRAs have faced accusations of bias and of lagging financial 
market movements, hence offering limited informational value. There has been regulatory 
reform of the rating industry, along with calls for a reduced role of credit ratings in financial 
markets (e.g. SEC, 2011). This paper seeks to contribute to the debate on the role of the CRA 
industry and its regulation. In particular, we investigate whether all types of sovereign credit 
rating news are informative in a context of multiple-rated issuers. 
We propose a model where multiple messengers’ opinions, i.e. multiple CRAs’ 
sovereign credit rating actions, interact with market heterogeneity. The latter plays a crucial 
role in solving many financial puzzles (e.g. Li and Muzere, 2010). The model illustrates that 
the information value of sovereign credit rating news does not lie exclusively in the hands of 
the first messenger who reveals a new element in the rated issuers’ creditworthiness. Additional 
messengers’ confirmation of another CRA’s actions could coordinate investors’ heterogeneous 
beliefs. It is noteworthy that our model allows the role of first messenger to switch from one 
CRA to another over time. The model yields several testable hypotheses regarding financial 
market reactions, as follows: (i) financial asset prices react to sovereign credit rating news from 
both types of messengers; (ii) price volatility increases in response to sovereign credit rating 
news from the first messenger because the news induces uncertainty and disagreement between 
market participants; (iii) price volatility reduces in response to sovereign credit rating news 
from additional messenger(s) when they confirm prior news.  
 Empirical investigations confirm that sovereign credit rating news coordinates 
investors’ beliefs. Based on a comprehensive sample of the largest three CRAs’ sovereign credit 
ratings, we find: (i) both types of rating news have a significant impact on FX and stock index 
returns with similar magnitude; (ii) FX and stock index volatilities increase in response to 
sovereign credit rating news from the first messenger, which directly indicates a strong degree 
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of heterogeneity in market reactions or investors’ beliefs about an item of information; (iii) the 
volatilities reduce significantly in response to sovereign credit news which contains no new 
information but rather confirms the prior opinion. A number of robustness checks have been 
conducted, including an EU sub-sample, Monte Carlo experiments, investigations on a sub-
sample of downgrades of issuers on prior negative outlook/watchlist, and controlling for 
macroeconomic factors.  
In summary, the paper illustrates the importance of sovereign credit rating information 
from multiple messengers. While the first messenger discloses new information and contributes 
to the price discovery process, additional messengers play an important role of coordinating 
investors’ heterogeneous beliefs. The findings are, to some extent, consistent with Boot et al. 
(2006) where ratings act as ‘a focal point’ and coordinate market actions. However, in contrast 
to Boot el al. (2006), we show that the coordination role of sovereign credit ratings does not 
necessarily require a particular CRA to take the leading role in the information discovery 
process. 
Contrary to a popular belief that negative rating actions increase asset price volatility, 
the paper demonstrates that additional negative sovereign credit rating news does not. The 
findings raise a caveat against calls for removing credit ratings from investment guidelines and 
regulations, at least in the context of sovereign credit ratings. There are clearly benefits of 
reducing overreliance on credit ratings. However, given the fact that a strong degree of market 
heterogeneity exists, sovereign credit rating signals (especially additional ones) could play an 
important “confirmation role” and reduce market uncertainty, and therefore could facilitate 
market access and fund flows. There is also a clear implication for regulators’ recent efforts to 
encourage new entrants to the rating industry.  
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Table 1: List of sample countries  
 Country No. of events 
  
Country No. of events 
(1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
1 Australia 1  22 Luxembourg 4 
2 Austria 4  23 Malaysia † 4 
3 Belgium 11  24 Malta 6 
4 Brazil 14  25 Mexico 9 
5 Chile 9  26 Netherlands 4 
6 Colombia 12  27 New Zealand 5 
7 Cyprus 32  28 Peru 16 
8 Czech Republic 7  29 Philippines 12 
9 Estonia 6  30 Poland 5 
10 Finland 3  31 Portugal 24 
11 France 5  32 Romania 6 
12 Germany 3  33 Russia † 13 
13 Greece 38  34 Slovakia 5 
14 Hungary 22  35 Slovenia 16 
15 India 4  36 South Africa 14 
16 Indonesia 17  37 Spain 24 
17 Ireland 25  38 Taiwan 3 
18 Israel 7  39 Thailand 6 
19 Italy 12  40 Turkey 16 
20 Japan 10  41 UK 8 
21 Korea 10     
 
The data set covers 41 countries during the period from 2007-2013. Among them, 17 EU countries using 
the Euro are included in the sample according to when they started using the Euro. All the countries are 
categorised as free floating or floating FX regimes in every IMF de facto classifications since it began in 
2006 except for 2 countries marked by † categorised in “Other managed arrangement” in 2010 and 2012 
when these domestic exchange rate arrangements do not meet the criteria for any of the other categories.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
AAA Stable 58 11.296 -0.748 -1.209 -1.555 
  Neg. outlook 57 10.549   -1.089 
  Neg. watch 56 10.087   -0.871 
AA+ Stable 55 9.742 -0.282 -0.526 -0.743 
  Neg. outlook 54 9.459   -0.659 
  Neg. watch 53 9.216   -0.600 
AA Stable 52 8.999 -0.198 -0.383 -0.558 
  Neg. outlook 51 8.801   -0.527 
  Neg. watch 50 8.616   -0.504 
AA- Stable 49 8.441 -0.167 -0.329 -0.487 
  Neg. outlook 48 8.274   -0.475 
  Neg. watch 47 8.112   -0.467 
BBB+ Stable 37 6.505 -0.190 -0.394 -0.617 
  Neg. outlook 36 6.315   -0.678 
  Neg. watch 35 6.111   -0.764 
BBB Stable 34 5.888 -0.250 -0.541 -0.894 
  Neg. outlook 33 5.638   -1.115 
  Neg. watch 32 5.347   -1.583 
BBB- Stable 31 4.994 -0.471 -1.229 -1.661 
  Neg. outlook 30 4.523   -1.920 
  Neg. watch 29 3.765   -1.605 
BB+ Stable 28 3.332 -0.730 -1.173 -1.500 
  Neg. outlook 27 2.603   -1.034 
  Neg. watch 26 2.159   -0.816 
BB Stable 25 1.833 -0.264 -0.489 -0.687 
  Neg. outlook 24 1.569   -0.604 
  Neg. watch 23 1.344   -0.545 
BB- Stable 22 1.145 -0.180 -0.347 -0.503 
  Neg. outlook 21 0.965   -0.473 
  Neg. watch 20 0.799   -0.450 
CCC+ Stable 10 -0.642 -0.157 -0.323 -0.503 
  Neg. outlook 9 -0.799   -0.545 
  Neg. watch 8 -0.965   -0.604 
CCC Stable 7 -1.145 -0.199 -0.423 -0.687 
  Neg. outlook 6 -1.344   -0.816 
  Neg. watch 5 -1.569   -1.034 
CCC- Stable 4 -1.833 -0.327 -0.770 -1.500 
  Neg. outlook 3 -2.159     
  Neg. watch 2 -2.603     
CC/D   1 -3.332    
 
This table presents the transformation of ratings to CCR, LCCR numerical scores and how the effect of 
a given rating action varies across the levels of creditworthiness. Columns (1) and (2) report the starting 
points of a rated issuer’s. The intermediate rating categories (A+/A/A- and B+/B/B-) are omitted in the 
interest of brevity. For ease of presentation, column (1) only specifies rating symbols from S&P and 
Fitch, but should be considered as including equivalent ratings from Moody’s (Aaa, Aa1, Aa2 ... Ca/D). 
Column (3) shows how the rating symbols along with outlook/watch statuses can be converted to a 58-
point CCR scale. Column (4) reports a logit-transformation (to address possible rating scale non-
linearity) of the 58-point CCR using Equation (18). Columns (5) - (7) illustrate how the effects of the 
same rating actions vary depending on the current level of creditworthiness. This table only reflects 
negative signals (for sake of brevity). A similar scaling can apply for positive rating actions.  
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Table 3: Rating events  
This table reports the numbers of rating events released by the CRAs on the sampled countries during the period from January 2007 to April 2013. Columns (1) 
- (3) report numbers of positive, negative, and total rating signals from S&P, respectively. Similarly, columns (4) to (9) report corresponding numbers from 
Moody’s and Fitch. Column (10) = (1) + (4) + (7); (11) = (2) + (5) + (8); (12) = (3) + (6) + (9). During the sample period, the CRAs released 59 combined 
rating signals and 9 multiple-rating-events days when multiple CRAs announced actions on the same sovereign(s). In these cases, only one action is counted. 
Please see Section 4 for more details.
No. of events 
S&P Moody’s Fitch Total 
up down Σ up Down Σ up down Σ up down Σ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Upgrade/ downgrade 27 56 83 28 48 76 25 45 70 80 149 229 
Of which:                         
1-notch up-/downgrade 23 39 62 28 24 52 23 25 48 74 88 162 
            (percentage) 85% 70% 75% 100% 50% 68% 92% 56% 69% 93% 59% 71% 
Preceded by outlook/watch 19 56 75 25 43 68 13 39 52 57 138 195 
           (percentage) 70% 100% 90% 89% 90% 90% 52% 87% 74% 71% 93% 85% 
             
Outlook 38 47 85 19 36 55 28 38 66 85 121 206 
Watch 7 27 34 12 23 35 3 14 17 22 64 86 
Total 72 130 202 59 107 166 56 97 153 187 334 521 
Total after excluding 
events on same 
sovereign(s) on same days 
70 113 183 56 82 138 55 83 138 181 278 459 
Of which:                         
  -  First-move 16 74 90 14 26 40 23 21 44 53 121 174 
 23% 65% 49% 25% 32% 29% 42% 25% 32% 29% 44% 38% 
  - Additional-move 54 39 93 42 56 98 32 62 94 128 157 285 
 77% 35% 51% 75% 68% 71% 58% 75% 68% 71% 56% 62% 
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Table 4: Impact on foreign exchange rates 
 First-move  Additional-move 
 [0] [1] [1,5]  [0] [1] [1,5] 
 Panel A All rating news  All rating news 
ΔLCCR -0.0032* -0.0012 -0.0060**  -0.0006 -0.0032** 0.0003 
t-val. -1.876 -0.767 -1.976  -0.417 -2.098 0.065 
CCR 0.00008 0.00010 0.00015  0.00001 0.00000 -0.00004 
t-val. 1.505 1.681 1.511  0.159 -0.053 -0.470 
R2 8.54% 8.16% 9.29%  7.59% 8.50% 8.40% 
Obs. 633 633 633  744 744 744 
 Panel B Downgrades  Downgrades 
ΔLCCR -0.0078** 0.0001 0.0048  -0.0002 -0.0048* -0.0047 
t-val. -2.184 0.042 0.804  -0.087 -1.776 -0.724 
CCR 0.00012 0.00006 -0.00002  -0.00002 0.00003 0.00006 
t-val. 1.848 0.786 -0.177  -0.383 0.430 0.437 
R2 12.14% 9.38% 11.15%  9.40% 11.19% 11.53% 
Obs. 522 522 522  528 528 528 
 Panel C Negative outlook/watch  Negative outlook/watch 
ΔLCCR -0.0028 -0.0047*** -0.0100**  -0.0026 -0.0059*** -0.0076 
t-val. -1.138 -2.592 -2.372  -1.497 -3.572 -1.123 
CCR 0.00006 0.00013 0.00018  0.00001 -0.00002 0.00011 
t-val. 0.837 1.920 1.379  0.227 -0.447 0.773 
R2 9.15% 12.24% 12.42%  9.79% 10.61% 10.32% 
Obs. 526 526 526  556 556 556 
 
This table reports the average values from 10,000 estimations of Equation (19) with Huber-White robust 
standard errors. The dependent variable is cumulative FX returns over the time windows. The main 
independent variable is ∆LCCR, daily changes in the log-transformation of ratings. Control variables 
include rating level (CCR); and lagged FX returns and policy interest rates, country and year dummies 
which are not reported to conserve space. Monte Carlo resampling is used. Each sample is country-
matched i.e. numbers of non-event observations in each country equal corresponding numbers in 
column 3 of Table 1. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels.   
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Table 5: Impact on foreign exchange realized volatility  
 
 First-move  Additional-move 
 [0] [1] [1,5]  [0] [1] [1,5] 
 Panel A All rating news  All rating news 
|ΔLCCR| 0.1706*** -0.1050 -0.1186  0.1998 -0.1084* 0.0378 
t-val. 2.648 -1.420 -1.269  1.550 -1. 791 0.354 
CCR 0.00020 -0.00361 0.00399  0.00549 -0.00183 0.00457 
t-val. 0.059 -1.078 1.000  1.576 -0.587 1.265 
R2 9.39% 10.17% 9.55%  7.25% 9.93% 9.15% 
Obs. 560 560 560  662 662 662 
 Panel B Downgrades  Downgrades 
|ΔLCCR| 0.1909** -0.2113 0.0102  0.1145 -0.1755** 0.2048 
t-val. 1.997 -1.626 0.078  1.227 -2.275 1.619 
CCR 0.00072 -0.00259 0.00101  0.00549 -0.00425 0.00427 
t-val. 0.167 -0.631 0.205  1.429 -1.090 0.962 
R2 11.30% 11.32% 11.09%  10.98% 11.33% 10.51% 
Obs. 474 474 474  480 480 480 
 Panel C Negative outlook/watch  Negative outlook/watch 
|ΔLCCR| 0.1171* -0.1407 0.0528  0.2589*** -0.0903* 0.1420 
t-val. 1.693 -1.592 0.689  2.643 -1.722 0.840 
CCR -0.00148 -0.00044 0.00040  0.00545 -0.00215 0.00623 
t-val. -0.359 -0.104 0.088  1.283 -0.527 1.348 
R2 10.87% 11.53% 11.41%  10.42% 10.69% 10.11% 
Obs. 480 480 480  508 508 508 
 
This table reports the average values from 10,000 estimations of Equation (20) with Huber-White robust 
standard errors. The dependent variable is cumulative changes in FX Realized volatility over the time 
windows. The main independent variable is |∆LCCR|, absolute values of daily changes in the log-
transformation of ratings. Control variables include rating level (CCR); and lagged FX returns and 
policy interest rates, country and year dummies which are not reported to conserve space. Monte Carlo 
resampling is used. Each sample is country-matched i.e. numbers of non-event observations in each 
country equal corresponding numbers in column 3 of Table 1. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, 1% levels.  
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Table 6: Impact on foreign exchange uncertainty (option-implied volatility) 
 First-move  Additional-move 
 [0] [1] [1,5]  [0] [1] [1,5] 
 Panel A All rating news  All rating news 
|ΔLCCR| 0.0210** 0.0089 -0.0258  0.0104 -0.0013 0.0146 
t-val. 2.114 1.120 -1.475  0.764 -0.107 0.737 
CCR 0.00074* -0.00026 -0.00094  0.00024 -0.00028 0.00001 
t-val. 1.692 -0.592 -1.219  0.532 -0.675 0.034 
R2 8.48% 8.81% 9.83%  7.64% 6.50% 7.91% 
Obs. 633 633 633  744 744 744 
 Panel B Downgrades  Downgrades 
|ΔLCCR| 0.0245* -0.0014 -0.0655**  -0.0178 0.0115 0.0108 
t-val. 1.671 -0.122 -2.391  -1.595 1.258 0.365 
CCR 0.00049 -0.00038 -0.00149  -0.00016 -0.00027 0.00007 
t-val. 0.874 -0.595 -1.550  -0.274 -0.485 0.094 
R2 12.35% 10.79% 12.88%  11.36% 11.62% 11.72% 
Obs. 522 522 522  528 528 528 
 Panel C Negative outlook/watch  Negative outlook/watch 
|ΔLCCR| 0.0181* 0.0051 -0.0167  0.0008 0.0216 0.0097 
t-val. 1.873 0.541 -0.756  0.101 1.392 0.273 
CCR 0.00019 -0.00015 -0.00053  0.00034 -0.00004 0.00064 
t-val. 0.356 -0.230 -0.537  0.654 -0.059 0.776 
R2 11.21% 10.49% 11.63%  10.28% 10.57% 10.86% 
Obs. 526 526 526  556 556 556 
 
This table reports the average values from 10,000 estimations of Equation (20) with Huber-White robust 
standard errors. The dependent variable is cumulative changes in FX option-implied volatility over the 
time windows. The main independent variable is |∆LCCR|, absolute values of daily changes in the log-
transformation of ratings. Control variables include rating level (CCR); and lagged FX returns and 
policy interest rates, country and year dummies which are not reported to conserve space. Monte Carlo 
resampling is used. Each sample is country-matched i.e. numbers of non-event observations in each 
country equal corresponding numbers in column 3 of Table 1. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, 1% levels.  
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[0] [1] [1,5] 
 
[0] [1] [1,5] 
Panel A: Impact on exchange rates 
ΔLCCR -0.0078** 0.0015 0.0048 
 
-0.0003 -0.0049* -0.0063 
t-val. -2.077 0.577 0.810 
 
-0.123 -1.773 -0.956 
CCR 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 
 
0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 
t-val. 1.578 0.501 -0.342 
 
-0.579 0.130 -0.458 
Interest 0.0019 0.0008 -0.0008  0.0003 0.0000 0.0017 
t-val. 1.556 0.574 -0.294  0.178 -0.070 0.701 
R2 14.55% 8.92% 11.48% 
 
9.11% 12.76% 11.92% 
Obs. 332 332 332  340 340            340  
Panel B: Impact on FX realized volatility 
|ΔLCCR| 0.1678* -0.1610 -0.0241  0.0797 -0.1629** 0.2634 
t-val. 1.664 -1.264 -0.1864  0.920 -2.437 1.536 
CCR 0.0030 -0.0059 0.0016  0.0055 -0.0063 0.0056 
t-val. 0.718 -1.454 0.305  1.597 -1.775 1.253 
Interest 0.0448 -0.0224 0.0654  -0.0212 -0.0007 0.0018 
t-val. 0.570 -0.333 0.730  -0.229 -0.076 0.008 
R2 11.01% 11.69% 10.60%  10.57% 11.98% 11.35% 
Obs. 298 298 298  305 305 305 
Panel C: Impact on FX option-implied volatility 
|ΔLCCR| 0.0580*** -0.0035 -0.0896  -0.0279* 0.0242 0.0241 
t-val. 2.625 -0.243 -1.471  -1.847 1.057 0.599 
CCR 0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0024  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
t-val. 1.100 -0.415 -2.336  -0.763 -0.260 -0.803 
Interest 0.0086 -0.0044 -0.0160  -0.0054 -0.0026 -0.0139 
t-val. 1.347 -0.620 -0.877  -0.887 -0.363 -0.803 
R2 12.97% 10.63% 10.01%  12.49% 11.33% 10.03% 
Obs. 332 332 332  340 340 340 
This table reports the average values from 10,000 estimations of Equations (19) and (20) with Huber-White robust 
standard errors based on the EU sub-sample. The dependent variables are cumulative FX returns (in Panel A), 
cumulative changes in FX Realized Volatility (in Panel B) and FX Option-Implied Volatility (in Panel C) over the 
time windows. The main independent variable is ∆LCCR in Panel A and |ΔLCCR| in Panels B and C. Control 
variables include rating level (CCR); and lagged FX returns and policy interest rates, interest spread between the 
domestic country and U.S, country and year dummies which are not reported to conserve space. Monte Carlo 
resampling is used. Each sample is country-matched i.e. numbers of non-event observations in each country equal 




Table 8: Impact on domestic stock indices’ mean-adjusted abnormal returns 
 First-move  Additional-move 
 [0] [1] [1,5]  [0] [1] [1,5] 
 Panel A All rating news  All rating news 
ΔLCCR 0.0043* 0.0013 0.0004  0.0007 0.0061** -0.0041 
t-val. 1.803 0.217 0.036  0.149 2.040 -0.443 
CCR -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0008  0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
t-val. -0.948 -1.220 -1.949  0.474 -1.305 -0.389 
R2 6.97% 8.16% 10.95%  6.04% 6.15% 10.25% 
Obs. 633 633 633  744 744 744 
 Panel B Downgrades  Downgrades 
ΔLCCR 0.0133* -0.0200 -0.0660  0.0060 0.0091* 0.0017 
t-val. 1.811 -1.545 -1.394  0.569 1.953 0.122 
CCR -0.0002 0.0001 0.0005  0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0004 
t-val. -1.007 0.564 1.157  0.359 -1.206 -0.801 
R2 8.74% 9.96% 17.67%  8.13% 9.81% 14.37% 
Obs. 522 522 522  528 528 528 
 Panel C Negative outlook/watch  Negative outlook/watch 
ΔLCCR 0.0018 0.0019 0.0012  0.0115 0.0116*** 0.0166 
t-val. 0.349 0.188 0.067  1.208 2.809 1.197 
CCR 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0009  -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0006 
t-val. -0.134 -1.351 -1.812  -1.506 -0.619 -1.468 
R2 8.08% 9.12% 12.52%  7.85% 7.88% 13.04% 
Obs. 526 526 526  556 556 556 
 
This table reports the average values from 10,000 estimations of Equation (19) with Huber-White robust 
standard errors. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal returns over the time windows. An 
abnormal return equals the return on an announcement day less the average return during the pre-even 
period of [-250, -50]. The main independent variable is ∆LCCR, daily changes in the log-transformation 
of ratings. Control variables include rating level (CCR); and lagged abnormal returns, country and year 
dummies which are not reported to conserve space. Monte Carlo resampling is used. Each sample is 
country-matched i.e. numbers of non-event observations in each country equal corresponding numbers 




Table 9: Impact on stock indices’ volatility  
 
 First-move  Additional-move 
 [0] [1] [1,5]  [0] [1] [1,5] 
 Panel A All rating news  All rating news 
|ΔLCCR| 0.0069** 0.0060* 0.0362***  0.0053 0.0032 0.0171 
t-val. 2.316 1.835 2.586  1.624 1.439 1.446 
CCR 0.0002 0.0001 0.0008  0.0002 0.0002 0.0008 
t-val. 1.620 0.693 1.525  1.591 2.195 1.623 
R2 22.24% 21.35% 25.57%  12.85% 12.45% 12.09% 
Obs. 633 633 633  744 744 744 
 Panel B Downgrades  Downgrades 
|ΔLCCR| 0.0124* 0.0157*** 0.0584***  0.0063 -0.0053* -0.0276 
t-val. 1.778 3.017 2.894  1.508 -1.893 -1.270 
CCR 0.0002 0.0002 0.0010  0.0002 0.0002 0.0010 
t-val. 1.248 1.092 1.521  1.311 1.287 1.341 
R2 26.18% 27.83% 31.30%  22.13% 30.56% 22.07% 
Obs. 522 522 522  528 528 528 
 Panel C Negative outlook/watch  Negative outlook/watch 
|ΔLCCR| 0.0009 0.0052 0.0401**  0.0104 0.0061 0.0460 
t-val. 0.278 1.172 2.066  1.487 1.445 1.437 
CCR 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004  0.0001 0.0002 0.0008 
t-val. 1.025 -0.062 0.475  0.687 1.595 1.217 
R2 20.90% 20.05% 30.37%  14.21% 13.16% 13.91% 
Obs. 526 526 526  556 556 556 
 
This table reports the average values from 10,000 estimations of Equation (20) with Huber-White robust 
standard errors. The dependent variable is cumulative changes in intraday high-low range over the time 
windows. The main independent variable is |∆LCCR|, absolute values of daily changes in the log-
transformation of ratings. Control variables include rating level (CCR); and lagged abnormal returns, 
country and year dummies which are not reported to conserve space. Monte Carlo resampling is used. 
Each sample is country-matched i.e. numbers of non-event observations in each country equal 





 Table 10: Impact of downgrades with prior negative outlook/watch  
 [0] [1] [1,5]  [0] [1] [1,5] 
Panel A: Impact on FX markets 
A.1: Impact on FX returns 
  First-move 
  
Additional-move 
ΔLCCR -0.0078** 0.0002 0.0051 0.0001 -0.0053* -0.0054 
t-val. -2.179 0.074 0.850  0.066 -1.932 -0.816 
CCR 0.00013 0.00005 -0.00005  -0.00002 0.00001 0.00006 
t-val. 1.900 0.700 -0.336  -0.296 0.155 0.460 
R2 12.31% 9.43% 11.38%  9.82% 11.82% 11.91% 
Obs. 518 518 518  522 522 522 
A.2: Impact on FX Realized volatility 
  First-move 
  
Additional-move 
|ΔLCCR| 0.1849* -0.2072 0.0026 0.1562 -0.1826** 0.1965 
t-val. 1.924 -1.578 0.018  1.483 -2.321 1.559 
CCR 0.00066 -0.00257 0.00087  0.00445 -0.00344 0.00491 
t-val. 0.150 -0.621 0.173  1.137 -0.845 1.060 
R2 11.36% 11.08% 11.12%  11.04% 11.32% 10.61% 
Obs. 470 470 470  474 474 474 
A.3: Impact on FX Option-implied volatility 
  First-move 
  
Additional-move 
|ΔLCCR| 0.0253 -0.0010 -0.0671** -0.0165* 0.0149 0.0055 
t-val. 1.402 -0.081 -2.467  -1.672 1.516 0.179 
CCR 0.00050 -0.00033 -0.00153  -0.00008 -0.00026 0.00018 
t-val. 0.873 -0.521 -1.582  -0.125 -0.454 0.207 
R2 12.32% 10.90% 13.08%  11.92% 11.85% 11.01% 
Obs. 518 518 518  522 522 522 
Panel B: Impact on domestic equity markets 
B.1: Impact on domestic equity cumulative abnormal returns 
  First-move 
  
Additional-move 
ΔLCCR 0.0397** 0.0034 -0.0094 0.0203 -0.0015 0.1129 
t-val. 2.203 0.262 -0.564  1.170 -0.070 1.467 
CCR -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0004  0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 
t-val. -0.761 -0.169 -0.826  -0.237 -0.564 -0.256 
R2 12.36% 10.32% 10.30%  11.47% 10.79% 18.51% 
Obs. 460 460 460  460 460 460 
B.2: Impact on domestic equity volatility 
  First-move 
  
Additional-move 
|ΔLCCR| 0.0149*** -0.0111*** 0.0138*** -0.0121* 0.0044 0.0204 
t-val. 3.386 -3.051 3.804  -1.692 0.544 1.522 
CCR 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
t-val. 0.279 -0.294 0.415  -0.395 0.162 0.279 
R2 11.17% 10.95% 10.93%  10.15% 10.19% 10.04% 
Obs. 446 446 446  446 446 446 
This table reports the average values from 10,000 estimations of Equations (19) - (20) with Huber-White 
robust standard errors. Only downgrades of issuers on negative outlook/watch are used for this table. *, 
**, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels. 
